Promotion and presence of partnerships have been growing within information and communication technology for development (ICT4D). Yetdespite limited analytical literature on this topicit is clear that the reality of ICT4D partnerships often undershoots the potential, with frequent reports of failure, particularly arising from conflict between partners. This paper addresses calls for more and better-conceptualized research into ICT4D partnerships, with a specific focus on understanding the roots and management of conflict in such partnerships. We use qualitative field data from a Malaysian IT "impact sourcing" public-private partnership case study, viewed through the lens of institutional logics and conflict management strategies. Analysis of three vignettes from the negotiation of the initiative shows one partner always used a competitive approach to conflict management. This led issues to remain unresolved and led the partnership arrangement to steadily loosen. The outcome was always domination of private logic over public logic. As a result, and lacking an overt advocate, welfare goals of the partnership were somewhat sidelined. Our paper contributes by showing (a) how institutional logics helps explain the outcome of ICT4D partnerships, and (b) how the conflict management strategies framework helps explain the practice of conflicting institutional logics in such partnerships.
Introduction
In an informal sense, use of information and communication technology for development (ICT4D) has always been about partnership. Arguably the first ICT4D installationthe HEC-2M computer at the Indian Statistical Institute in Kolkata in 1956was a three-way collaboration between the Institute, the British Tabulating Machine Company, and London's Birkbeck College (Heeks, 2009) . But the formal promotion and use of partnerships grew especially from the turn of the century:
. the Millennium Development Goals made explicit reference to working together with the private sector on ICTs in target 8F; . the structures and processes emanating therefromthe UN ICT Task Force, the World Summit on the Information Society events and actions, the UN Global Alliance for ICT and Development, etcwere all multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) (Unwin, 2009) ; and . the Sustainable Development Goals place a strong emphasis on partnership (e.g. goal 17) reflected, for example, in formation of the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data.
Alongside this growth in drivers to, and practice of ICT4D partnerships, though, has been substantial evidence of problems. There are problems with outcomes: "A well-known and concerned consequence of ICT4D partnerships is that they tend to be far from being truly successful" (Park & Lejano, 2013, p. 49) . And there are problems with processes: "Tensions and conflicts, disappointments and misunderstandings are almost inherent to most ICT4D PPPs [public-private partnerships]" (Mizrachi & Ben-Attar, 2011, p. 39) . A continuous refrain has been the notion of conflict between partners; either using that explicit term as in the previous quote (see also Jamali, 2004) or analogues: "antagonism" (Adam, James, & Wanjira, 2007) , "differences … friction" (ODF, 2007) , "mismatch … misalignment" (Silvius, Sheombar, & Smit, 2009) , "disagreement" (Tribe, 2011) , "tensions" (Geldof, Grimshaw, Kleine, & Unwin, 2011) , etc. Mirroring growth in practice, there has been a growth in literature about ICT4D partnerships (Geldof et al., 2011; Park & Lejano, 2013) . But the analysis undertaken by these cited reviews shows much of that literature to be research involving partnerships, but not research specifically into partnerships. As yet, research into ICT4D partnerships has therefore been very limited, prompting calls for more such work (again, Geldof et al., 2011; Park & Lejano, 2013) . In particular, it has been noted that there is an almost complete absence of analytical work using a theorized approach to frame the investigation.
It is into this knowledge gap that the current paper steps. Its general aim is to deepen our understanding of ICT4D partnerships. Its specific objective is to provide a conceptualized understanding of the differences and conflict that exist within ICT4D partnerships: their manifestation and management. We select the overall theoretical lens of institutional logics, including specific operationalization via a conflict management framework. We apply this to a particular ICT4D partnership: a Malaysian public-private partnership seeking to develop a collaborative project on IT impact sourcing; defined as "the practice of hiring and training marginalized individuals to provide information technology, business process, or other digitally-enabled services" (Carmel, Lacity, & Doty, 2014, p. 401) . We investigate three research questions that will directly address current knowledge gaps: the particular gap around theorized analysis of such partnerships. Our paper demonstrates the potential for institutional logics to be used much more widely to analyze these partnerships. It is shown to expose and conceptualize the root causes of conflict within partnership, the management of which can be both analyzed and guided by the conflict management framework.
In the next section, we explore first the limited literature on ICT4D partnerships to summarize what we already know and what more remains to be known; and then summarize institutional logics as a theory and conflict management as a framework. In Section 3, the research setting and methods are outlined. The case description is presented in Section 4. Analysis of three vignettes from the case is presented in Section 5, followed by discussion of answers to the research questions in Section 6, and overall conclusions in the final section.
2. Literature review and conceptual framework 2.1. ICT4D partnerships Partnerships have been defined as voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both public and non-public, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and, as mutually agreed, to share risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits. (UNGA, 2016, p. 4) Partnerships can more simply be understood as "relationships between different parties working towards a common goal" (Geldof et al., 2011, p. 40) .
They come in many forms, from tightly-contracted agreements and joint ventures to more informal collaborations (ibid.). Within the ICT4D domain, four main focal areas can be identified:
. Those delivering foundational infrastructure; for example, the partnership between donors and multiple private operators to provide the East African Submarine Cable System that supplies broadband to Africa's East Coast (Khalil, Dongier, & Qiang, 2009 ). . Those seeking to apply ICTs within a particular development sector such as health, education, government, small enterprise, etc; for example, the partnership between the Andhra Pradesh government and the Satyam Foundation NGO to deliver an mhealth project in India (Qiang, Yamamichi, Hausman, Miller, & Altman, 2012) . . Those applying ICTs for enterprises within the digital economy; for example, the partnership between India's Kerala state government and local entrepreneurs to create hundreds of telecenters and telekiosks (Kuriyan, Ray, & Toyama, 2008) . . Those with goals of shared ICT4D learning and/or policy advocacy; for example, the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data (GPSDD, 2016) , which brings together government, private and NGO partners to improve the use of data within development.
As illustrated, ICT4D partnerships can involve partners from public sector, private sector, NGOs, social enterprise and donor agencies. Two particular types stand out (Unwin, 2015) . First, PPPs involving one or more partners from the public and private sectors working together. Second, MSPs, typically interpreted to mean three or more partners and including representation from public and private and NGO/community sectors. As noted in the Introduction, partnerships have existed throughout the history of applying ICTs to socio-economic development but they were given a particular boost from the text, processes and structures surrounding the Millennium Development Goals. The sense from literatureboth research and practice-orientedis of growth in both the actual numbers of ICT4D partnerships, and also the perceived and assumed place of these partnerships within the ICT4D 'toolkit'. Quantitative evidence is rarely provided but in terms of worldview, most major ICT4D stakeholders now see partnerships as "central to the implementation of information and communication technologies for development (ICT4D) initiatives" (Unwin, 2015, p. 635) ; for example, being seen as "best" (Geldof et al., 2011, p. 10) and "increasingly the vehicles of choice" (Hosman, 2011, p. 232) for ICT4D implementation. As also noted, partnerships in development were given a further boost by their strong presence within the Sustainable Development Goals and related literature and practice (Heeks, 2014; UNGA, 2015) .
Drivers to this growing subjective and objective presence of partnerships within ICT4D likely include:
. Successful examples of partnerships (including those cited above; see also Adam et al., 2007; Mizrachi & Ben-Attar, 2011; Unwin, 2009 ). . A much wider perception of benefits with partnerships such that they become one of the 'silver bullets' much sought-after in development (Hulme, 2016) . They are regarded as importanteven necessaryfor ICT4D initiatives because ICT4D is widely seen to address multi-level, multi-factoral, complex development problems; to create multiple digital cross-linkages; and to require a wide range of capabilities and other resources (Greener, 2004; ODF, 2007; Park, 2013) . . The self-interest of those involved, particularly the private sector seeking access to new resources and markets (McLaughlin, 2005; Unwin, 2015) .
Partnerships have therefore been strongly promoted by key actors within ICT4D, including UN agencies, the World Bank, national governments, international NGOs, and multinationals (Hosman, 2011; Jamali, 2004) . Despite their potential importance in development, it seems the positive perceptions of ICT4D partnerships run well ahead of reality. There are individual cases of problems: for example, a telecom infrastructure public-private partnership in Lebanon that had to be terminated (Jamali, 2004) , and a public-NGO e-government partnership in India that did not deliver a workable system (Mohan, Cutrell, & Parthasarathy, 2013) . And there are more wide-ranging reports of problems. Reviews of literature, for example, report "the lack of truly successful partnerships" (Geldof et al., 2011, p. 45) ; "very high" failure rates of ICT4D public-private partnerships (Mirza, 2013, p. 159) ; and that, despite potential for multi-stakeholder ICT4D partnerships to "deliver effective development interventions, the vast majority do not actually do so" (Unwin, 2015, p. 634) .
A causal connection between partnership (as opposed to other factors) and the overall success or failure of ICT4D initiatives is more often hypothesized than investigated (Geldof et al., 2011; Park, 2013) : given that many ICT4D projects fail, partnership may not always be the main catalyst. Nevertheless, partnership is specifically identified as a potential problem, with a key theme of conflict, especially where partners are drawn from different sectors: conflicting goals and motivations (Silvius et al., 2009) ; conflicting organizational cultures (Mizrachi & Ben-Attar, 2011) ; conflicting working practices (ODF, 2007) ; etc. Partnership is thus cited as both a critical success factor and critical failure factor in ICT4D, and steering between the two requires that these conflicts be understood and appropriately managed (Park, 2013) .
Yet, while these issues may be the subject of some research literature, they are rarely the object of research. In the Introduction, we noted the lack of research into ICT4D partnerships generally, the particular lack of theoretically-framed analytical research, and the calls for more such research; a call to which this paper is a response. But we note here a specific need for research into the potential conflicts between partners as a result of their differences; conflict that is the basis for at least some of the problems that ICT4D partnerships encounter, and which needs to be understood and addressed if these partnerships are to fulfill their development potential.
Conceptualizing partnership conflict
In their discussion of ICT4D partnerships, Hosman and Fife (2008) speak of "conflicting logic" as a foundational challenge. Following this pointer, we identify institutional logics as a theoretical perspective of potential value in analyzing ICT4D partnerships. Traditional institutional theory tends to emphasize homogeneity and stability. But institutional logics was specifically developed to explain patterns of heterogeneity and change such as one might find in situations of conflict (Friedland & Alford, 1991) . Institutional logics are defined as " … the set of material practices and symbolic systems including assumptions, values, and beliefs by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences" (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 101) .
Institutional logics therefore consist of both material elementsorganizations, technologies, work processesand symbolic elementsideas, values, discourses. And institutional logics operate at multiple levels: societal, organizational, and individual (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) . We can immediately see a relevance to our focus given that "material practices and symbolic systems" of a logic will encompass the elements earlier identified as sources of conflict in ICT4D partnerships: goals and motivations, culture, and working practices. Indeed, the key institutional logics insight is that individuals, organizations, and society are shaped by multiple and even contradictory logics.
There are many different categorizations of logics. A foundational categorization identifies logics of family, community, religion, state, market, profession, and corporation (ibid.). The conflict between these provides the space for institutional agency and change but also the space for discord and failure. As work on institutional logics has continued, a number of developments have emerged. There has been recognition of additional context-specific logics that may conflict, with some examples identified in the literature below. There has also been recognition that literature has been stronger in exposing structural features of logics than in identifying the nature of agency. In particular, and of relevance here, there has been relatively little work looking at how logic conflicts are managed by individuals in organizational settings (Pache & Santos, 2013) .
Use of institutional logics as a conceptual frame has been rapidly-growing but recent in the academic literature. We have thus only latterly begun to see use within the ICT4D field, and that use has so far been limited. In some cases, the focus has been on a single organization. For example, work on IT impact sourcing (as noted above, one aspect of the selected case study in this paper) has looked at individual service providers and the way in which they present different logics to different external stakeholders: presenting more features of commercial logic to clients, and more features of welfare logic to employees (Nicholson, Malik, Morgan, & Heeks, 2015) .
In other cases, multiple organizations are involved. There is a theme of mutual interdependence of logics and organizations; for example, between sovereignty logic and economic logic in a GIS project in Brazil involving multiple public sector organizations (Hayes & Rajao, 2011) , or between aid entitlement logic and development project impact logic in a health management information system in Malawi involving public and NGO sector actors (Sanner & Saebø, 2014) . However, the more dominant use of institutional logics has been as a means to understand contestation and conflict. Institutional logics have particularly been used to analyze the design-reality gaps that exist within ICT4D projects. For example, they have highlighted the conflicting worldviews and hence gaps that arise between designers and users:
. of a health management information system in Tajikistan While partnerships of some kind have been involved in these initiativesfor example, the Tajikistan project involved partners from public sector, donor agencies, and academia (Sahay et al., 2010 )in none of these cases was partnership the object of study. So, as yet, institutional logics has not been used as the basis to understand ICT4D partnerships. Institutional logics have been applied to study partnerships in other arenas. In particular, there is a small set of literature using logics to analyze public-private partnerships (another aspect of the selected case study in this paper). Alongside broader work (e.g. Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012), we found two studies that apply institutional logics in ICT PPPs (Beck, Gregory, & Marschollek, 2015; Marschollek & Beck, 2012) , both of which study the same case of a PPP used to deliver infrastructure for automated collection of truck tolls in Germany. In all these cases, two conflicting logics are identified: private logic and public logic.
Private logic focuses on economic goals, particularly relating to turnover and profit, and on practice based on professional routine. This is consistent with the described logic associated with private-sector organizations in wider institutional logics literature (e.g. Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013) . Public logic emphasizes achievement of social and/or welfare goals for the general public via practice based on law, policy, and stipulated guidelines; the latter often conceived as bureaucratic procedure. There is some consistency with descriptions of public sector organizational logic in other literature, though some sources also addalongside the welfare and bureaucratic componentsa political element linked to advancing more self-serving interests of individuals, groups, or organizations within the public sector (Marshall, Ambrose, McIvor, & Lamming, 2015; Thompson, 2011) .
By analyzing related phenomena, then, the literature to date has shown the potential value of institutional logics in helping understand ICT4D partnerships, even if it has not yet been directly used to analyze the conflict within these partnerships. We can see many different types of logic that could form the basis for an analysis but past literature has specifically looked at PPPs and validated the existence of, and conflict between, public and private logics; something taken up within the main case study of this paper.
Conceptualizing partnership conflict management
Conflicting logics are a major stumbling block for achievement of organizational objectives; a stumbling block that must be strategically managed to ensure success (Battilana & Dorado, 2010) . The work to date cited above, using institutional logics, provides illustrations of such strategies within successful partnerships: for example, collaboration to establish new hybrid norms and practices (Beck et al., 2015; Marschollek & Beck, 2012) , or communication between partners and creation of mutual learning spaces (Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012) . But it provides no framework to categorize such strategies.
The wider literature on conflicting institutional logics provides other typologies, for instance of the nature or outcomes of conflict between logics (e.g. Besharov & Smith, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013) . There aremore rarelytypologies of strategies for addressing conflicting logics (e.g. Battilana & Lee, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010) . However, these apply to strategies within individual organizations that are the subject of conflicting logics, and they do not fit a situation of multiple organizations in partnership. They are also reactions to conflicting logics rather than, as in a partnership, enactments of individual logics that can lead to conflict (or other outcomes).
We therefore turned to the broader management literature, and sought a framework that would encompass management of conflict within partnerships (including our own emergent findings), and which also was in widespread research use. We identified the framework outlined by Thomas and Kilmann (1974) , which frames five conflict management strategies which vary along two dimensions, of cooperativeness and assertiveness (see Figure 1 ). Subsequent application of this model has taken two main directions. First, attempts to explain underlying causes of the strategies adopted, for example, through measurement of behavioral intentions or other situational variables (Thomas, 1992) . This has been problematic, with challenges to validity and predictive power (e.g. Kabanoff, 1987; Womack, 1988) . Secondmore straightforward and as applied herehas been the use of the framework to categorize observed behaviors, including some prior application to ICT-related conflicts (e.g. Montoya-Weiss, Massey, & Song, 2001; Rukanova, Wigand, van Stijn, & Tan, 2015) .
To provide a little more detail (Montoya-Weiss et al., 2001; Thomas & Kilmann, 1974) , a competing strategy is a win-lose approach characterized by high assertiveness and low cooperativeness. Organizational actors that adopt this strategy tend to pursue their own goals at the expense of others. This strategy is seen as most appropriate in circumstances that call for quick, decisive actions. A collaborating strategy is characterized by behaviors that are both assertive and cooperative, which often leads to a win-win outcome. In this strategy, both contending parties work together to achieve the goals that they agree upon. An avoiding strategy for conflict management is both unassertive and uncooperative. Those using this strategy will find excuses to not deal with the conflict at hand, and will often adopt tactics of postponement and withdrawal. An accommodating conflict management strategy is characterized by cooperative but unassertive behaviors. Those adopting this strategy put others before themselves and sacrifice their own interests to satisfy those of others. This strategy is seen as appropriate when people think that the other party is right or the other party has more stake in the issue or when preserving future relations is more important than gaining immediate returns. Compromising is the strategy that is balanced in both assertiveness and cooperativeness. It is often associated with bargaining or trading. This strategy is generally used when the goals of both sides are of equal importance and/or when both sides have equal power.
We will now apply this conflict management strategies framework to help understand the actions taken within a context of competing institutional logics in our case study ICT4D partnership. First, though, the next section explains the basis for our research.
Research setting and methods

Research setting
The research setting for this study encompasses an ICT4D initiative in Malaysia. Author Ismail undertook fieldwork in Malaysia from October 2014 until April 2015. A Malaysian government agency (anonymized as "MGA") was entrusted to lead the initiative, which was part of an overall national digital strategy. The objective of the initiative is to use IT outsourcing to improve socio-economic conditions of more marginalized groups, especially the "B40": defined in economic terms as the lower 40% of Malaysia's populationincluding young peoplethat earns less than RM3,050 (US$850) per month. It therefore falls within the definition (given above) of IT impact sourcing. However, the initiative is also a response to complaints from the IT sector about constraints in supply of labor for IT outsourcing.
To kick-start the initiative, four pilot projects were established. One of the projects was chosen as our case (pseudonym, "Merah"). Merah is a partnership between a local public university (pseudonym, "UniRa") and a local private sector IT outsourcing company (pseudonym, "InTech") to set up an IT impact sourcing center. Hence it is an example of an ICT4D partnershipspecifically, an ICT4D public-private partnership. PPPs have been quite widely used in Malaysia, including in the ICT arena (Kaliannan, Awang, & Raman, 2010) . Given that the Merah project was only initiated in the latter half of 2014, our focus was on the negotiation stage of the partnership. We saw this as particularly valuable. Review of the ICT4D partnership literature found no research that specifically analyzed partnership negotiations, yet there is widespread agreement (e.g. Adam et al., 2007; Geldof et al., 2011; Jamali, 2004 ) that the planning and negotiation phase of partnerships is crucial to their overall success or failure.
Data collection
To investigate the issue in its natural setting, this study follows an interpretive case study approach (Walsham, 2006) . Qualitative methods were employed to collect case data, including semi-structured and unstructured interviews, direct observations, and document analysis, primarily at UniRa, InTech, and MGA. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were used as their flexibility helps researchers gain a deep understanding of the meanings given by participants to the phenomenon under study; a necessity in order to gain insight into both conflict management strategies and underlying logics (Silverman, 2013) . In total, 32 semi-structured interviews and five unstructured interviews were conducted with employees, middle-and higher level management of both partners, and the government agency over a period of six months between November 2014 and April 2015. Interviews were framed around the formation and implementation of IT impact sourcing initiatives, including Merah. Altogether 17 employees, 12 middle managers, and 8 higher-level managers were interviewed, chosen based on a purposive sampling approach (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2015) . The interviews were conducted in English or Malay, mostly took place at the work place of the interviewees and lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.
Author Ismail also joined in four negotiation meetings between partners and MGA as an observer. Written notes were taken from the meetings as no recording was allowed. We also accessed a large volume of archival data, including the Merah project plan and reports, news clippings and publicity materials, and organizational websites. The documents were reviewed to get background information on the project and to corroborate data from interviews and observation.
Data analysis
There are different ways in which the data gathered could have been analyzed and presented. Here we have chosen to frame this around the use of vignettes. A vignette is defined as a focused description of a series of events taken to be representative, typical, or emblematic in the case you are studying. It has a narrative, story-like structure that preserves chronological flow and that is normally limited to a brief time span, to one or a few key actors, to a bounded space, or to all three. (see also Miles, 1990; Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013, p. 182) The use of vignettes has been shown to help information systems researchers illustrate key practices or events and details that are relevant to a case study (e.g. Kotlarsky, Scarbrough, & Oshri, 2014) .
Following general analysis of the gathered data, specific vignette-oriented analysis was undertaken in two stages. First, we identified three vignettes representative of the broader data collected from fieldwork (Miles et al., 2013) , and representative of the negotiations underpinning the formation of the IT impact sourcing partnership. Our selection criteria for the vignettes were that their events should be identified as significant by multiple respondents, and should reflect conflict between the partners. The data used in vignette construction were triangulated from multiple respondents, and from a combination of interview transcripts, meeting observation and participation notes, and digitization of other documentary materials. The vignettes were also reviewed by the non-participating authors to reduce dangers of participatory bias.
Second, we analyzed the vignette data using computerized data analysis software (NVivo) and an iterative thematic coding approach (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006) . Based on a sub-set of the vignette data, we inductively analyzed a set of initial high-level themes around the espoused worldviews of the partners, and around the particular strategies they adopted in their interactions. We then reviewed the literature on institutional logics and identified that the worldviews were representative of private and public logics (e.g. Beck et al., 2015) . And we reviewed the literature on conflict management and identified that the strategies were representative of at least some of the categories within the Thomas-Kilmann strategies model (1974) . We then utilized these two conceptualizations as coding frames for further deductive analysis of the entire vignette data set. One implication is that there was data collected which was unrelated to private/public logic conflict. That is not reported here given our central focus on the questions posed at the start of the paper, and on the emergent issue of conflict.
Case description
The establishment of Merah started in July 2014 with a meeting between "Arjun" (a consultant appointed by MGA), "Nordin" (MGA senior officer), "Siti" (a professor of UniRa), and "Siva" (CEO of InTech). Arjun gave an overview of objectives for the initiative, details of the pilot project, and its expected outcomes. MGA acted as a facilitator, assisting the discussion between the partners and allocating in excess of US$100,000 for the project. After the meeting, UniRa and InTech in principle agreed to work with each other. Later Siti brought "Mokhzani," the acting CEO of the business arm of UniRa (pseudonym, "UniRa Commerce"), into her team. She planned to put UniRa's side of the project under UniRa Commerce, which was agreed by Mokhzani. Although UniRa Commerce conducts commercial activities (in the fields of education, research and development), it operates within the scope set by its board of directors (who are mainly university officers) and sets the interests of UniRa as a public university as its priority.
Though it had no prior organizational or personal relationships with InTech, UniRa was chosen to run the pilot project for three reasons. It had immediate access to an appropriate talent pool (i.e. students) that suited the profile the project was targeting (B40 youth). It was able to provide the technical facilities to set up the IT impact sourcing center for training and employment. And it had a couple of academic staff with expertise in IT-related outsourcing. InTech was chosen on the basis of its experience in bringing IT outsourcing jobs to university students (not UniRa). Merah was set up to provide outsourcing training to students, expose them to real working experience in the IT outsourcing industry, and thus improve their opportunities for later employment in that industry given fresh graduates have historically had lower-than-average employment rates. Siva agreed to bring some of InTech's existing image processing and video analysis work contracted from a large American multinational company to the new center (Merah) established in UniRa. UniRa would provide the facilities to set up the center and promote the project to its targeted groups of students.
Initially they agreed to work together as a joint venture with creation of a joint entity and sharing of profits and losses. However after negotiating for about three months, they realized a joint venture was not possible as they could not agree on the division of profits and losses. They then decided to work in a "smart partnership" arrangement, a term they used to refer to a project-based working relationship where neither a joint-entity structure nor sharing of profits and losses is involved. About three months later Mokhzani, for personal reasons, left UniRa Commerce, which subsequently resulted in UniRa Commerce withdrawing from the UniRa partnership team. Determined to make the project materialize, Siti then proposed to "Azman," the Dean of the Faculty to which she was attached, her idea of putting the project under the Faculty, to which he agreed. After a few meetings, Azman noticed a lack of consensus among the partners on some important aspects of the partnership. He concluded that the collaboration could not move forward in a smart partnership mode and suggested a "client-provider" relationship instead. Siti and Siva concurred. In this working relationship, InTech would be the client, and UniRa would act as the service provider. However InTech would still help in the setting up of the center and in training UniRa's B40 students. Eventuallyin early 2015 and more than six months after the initial discussion both parties signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA). In practice, subsequent performance of the partnership did not meet expectations.
Findings and analysis
The findings and analysis of data are presented in three vignettes, with quotations chosen to illustrate key findings. In this study, the vignettes describe the conflicts between private logic and public logic, and the subsequent strategies used by partners to negotiate their conflicting logics. The timeline of the vignettes follows the changes of the mode of partnership they were trying to establish from joint venture (vignette 1) to smart partnership (vignette 2) and eventually to a client-provider relationship (vignette 3).
Vignette 1: allocation for research activities
Before a letter of intent for working together as a partnership was signed, in one of the meetings attended by Siva, Siti, Mokhzani, Nordin, and "Kieran" (another MGA officer), Siti put forward a proposal that 10% of the net profit of the joint venture be allocated for research. She argued that generating new knowledge was an essential part of UniRa's existence as a university and would be the priority in any activities or programs it is involved in. She said:
In any programme with outsiders we (UniRa) will always look for opportunities to do research. The allocation will help finance any costs related to the research activities.
Siva was hesitant to agree to the request. He argued that a financial allocation for research was only warranted if it could benefit the partnership directly and not just be a mere academic exercise by the public partner to create knowledge. This was captured in his comment: I can't see how the research would help us make profit, bring more clients. Besides you (Siti) have many other avenues for research grants, why bother to get it from this partnership? Let's concentrate on what we are here for, making profits.
They left the meeting without mutual agreement on the matter. The matter was brought back when they met again in the following meeting. Siva remained steadfast that no allocation for research should be granted unless immediate commercial benefits accrued. Realising that there was no way for her to convince Siva to agree to the request, Siti compromised her goals. She proposed that, if an allocation was not possible, at least she should be given access to data (people, documents, etc.) within the partnership for research purposes. Siva happily agreed to the request because it did not compromise his stance on financing research. He said:
As long as no money is involved, I'm fine with it, you can have access to whatever you need for your research, including access to InTech.
Vignette 2: knowledge transfer
In another meeting attended by Siva, Siti, Mokhzani and Kieran to discuss details of the proposed Memorandum of Agreement for the partnership, Mokhzani raised the issue of knowledge transfer. He said:
We hope to learn from InTech how to run a successful outsourcing service. We are sure with the experience that Mr. Siva has under his sleeve, he'd share his knowledge and expertise.
The public partner saw a "smart partnership" more as an opportunity to learn from the private partner through knowledge transfer than to make profit. Siti reiterated that inbound knowledge transfer is one of the key performance indicators set by the university when working with an outside party. She explained that they were interested in operational and managerial knowledge. Mokhzani added that he planned to relocate some of his executives at UniRa Commerce to Merah for this purpose.
Siva did not respond immediately to the request and promised to get back to the issue in the next meeting. However the next morning Siti received a call from Kieran, the MGA officer. He wanted to have a one-on-one meeting with Siti to discuss the issue. In the meeting Kieran explained:
Siva told me that they have built their business intelligence over 25 years, it is unfair just to ask them to transfer the knowledge. This could jeopardize their competitive advantage in the market.
Siti did not budge. She maintained that it was a prerequisite in any relationship UniRa has with an outside partner. After finding that Kieran had not been able to convince Siti, Siva sent an email to Siti reinforcing what Kieran had already told her. Siti did not respond to Siva's email or a subsequent call. Siva wrote some further emails to Siti elaborating his stance on the issue with the hope that Siti would be more understanding and reply to him. After about a week, Siva realized Siti would not be responding. As a last resort, on Siva's request Kieran asked Nordin to intervene, as he saw no way of convincing Siti. Nordin met Siti and explained MGA's stance on the issue, which was to support Siti's view.
As a result, there was no mention of transfer of knowledge in the MoA and this "smart" component lapsed. It was argued thatas the talent pool comes from the public partnerthere is a transfer of knowledge through the skills and experience the students acquire during employment.
Vignette 3: talent development
One of the main objectives of the IT impact sourcing initiative is to develop capabilities among young people including working-age students who fit the definition of B40. In one of the meetings they attended before the Memorandum of Agreement was signed, Siti raised the issue of the nature of the capabilities students were acquiring. She said:
It is not enough to just train the students in task-related skills, which are mostly low-level technical skills. They should also be trained in other higher-level technical skills and some managerial skills which are good for their long-term career prospects. I'd suggest Mr. Siva to consider taking some of the students into his management team. After all this is what this project is all about.
Dean Azman reinforced this by highlighting the need to adhere to the original ambition of the pilot project stipulated in its guideline, which was to equip B40 students with technical and managerial skills so that they will have a better chance to join the IT outsourcing sector upon graduation. To this, Siva responded:
Training costs money and time so we only train the talent with the skills that are needed to perform their jobs. I'm not sure whether I'd agree with your suggestion to have some students in the management team. As I said, it takes time for the students to learn, they are already preoccupied with their studies. Besides I think what we have now is enough to manage the operation.
The meeting ended without any agreement on this issue. In the next few meetings, Siti persistently raised the issue. She insisted on Siva taking several students into his managerial team. Initially Siva just gave passing remarks like "I'll think about it" but then he stopped completely giving any response to the request. Up to the time of writing, Siva had not taken any students on board in his management team. Currently students are trained only in the skills needed to perform the jobs outsourced to them by InTech.
Vignette analysis
In the deductive phase of data analysis, each of the vignettes was analyzed according to a set framework. First, the key stakeholders from the two sides of the partnership were identified. Second, the particular logic that they drew from in understanding and representing their interests was identified. It was then linked to features of public and private logics outlined earlier: public logic focusing on political and societal goals and services and taking an open approach to ownership, and private logic focusing on economic goals and profits and taking a proprietary approach to ownership. Third, and given that Public logic: Capacity development should focus on the IT impact sourcing project objectives: to train lowerincome youth in the technical and managerial skills that will benefit them in entering the IT outsourcing sector upon graduation. The conflict management strategies Avoidance:
Did not give any response to the request for students to join the management team.
Competition:
Continued insisting that several students should join the management team to acquire managerial skills.
The outcome
Although the issue is unresolved at the time of writing, there are no students on the Merah-InTech management team.
Logic outcome
Dominance of private logic each one of the vignettes represents a conflict between public and private logic, the particular conflict management strategy adopted by each stakeholder was categorized using the schema of Thomas and Kilmann (1974) described earlier. Finally the outcome in each case was analyzed. For reasons of brevity, only a summary analysis can be provided here, as shown in Table 1 .
Discussion
Section 5 provides an overall answer and Table 1 provides a summary answer to the first research question about the conflicts that arose in developing this ICT4D partnership: conflicts about funding for research, transfer of learning and intelligence about outsourcing, and provision of management competencies for B40 students. An emergent finding is that all three vignettes are conflicts about knowledge: the mechanisms through which knowledge is created, its value and purpose, and its ownership and distribution. In part, this reflects involvement in the partnership of a university. But knowledgeincluding exchange of knowledgeis fundamental to all partnerships (Klijn & Teisman, 2000; Teo & Bhattacherjee, 2014) , including ICT4D partnerships (Unwin, 2009 ). Yet it is a resource which to date has not been afforded much scrutiny: ICT4D partnership research and practice should therefore give more explicit recognition to the role of knowledge.
Answering the second question about the nature and impact of strategies adopted to address these conflicts, we can see thatbar one exceptionthe partners' strategies in setting up this ICT4D partnership have been uncooperative. One partner always adopted a competitive stance and the other partner's reaction may have made the problem disappear in the short-term but did nothing to help bind the two together in the longerterm. This helps explain the spiraling down of the partnership arrangements into an ever-looser format so that, by the end, what had been intended as a strong partnership was anything but. This did not bode particularly well for the future and nor did the unwillingness of the private partner to compromise, even in a variety of circumstances: when the public partner had done so; when a third party became involved; and when the public partner attempted to adopt a competitive strategy. It is no surprise then that, beyond the negotiation stage, this partnership did not manage to build the intended largescale IT impact sourcing operation. The conflict management strategies framework has therefore proved useful not merely for categorization, but also for providing some further insights into the actors, their motivations, and the potential longer-term impact of their actions.
As explained earlier, use of the Thomas-Kilmann framework to categorize the behaviors of conflict may explain what happens, but it does not explain the underlying causes of any observed conflict. There are different ways we could have approached this, but here we chose to frame our third question in terms of the nature and outcome of institutional logics. Addressing that question, we saw that conflict arose due to differences between a private logic held by the private-sector partner, and a public logic held by the public university partner. We therefore did not need institutional logics to identify that conflict had arisen, nor to identify the strategies used to address that conflict. But institutional logics was the means by which we can understand why such conflict arises between ICT4D partners, and what the particular nature of underlying tension and mismatch is.
The expression of private logic was driven by competition and profit, so that Siva and InTech took a commercial view of knowledge. This was an instrumental view of its creation and purpose: that it should be created solely in the service of immediate commercial gains. And it was a proprietary view of its ownership and distribution: that knowledge is privately-owned and should not be shared unless, again, for commercial gain. The public logic espoused by Siti and the University takes a more open view of knowledge: as something to be created in the public sphere for wider societal benefits and more openly shared without thought of commercial gain. The nature of the public logic of UniRa is particular. It has not embraced the most open and collaborative form of public logic: UniRa set up a commercial arm and some of its arguments are compatible with a more nuanced perspective that sees the University, not the wider public sphere, as being the intended beneficiary of knowledge transfer. Nonetheless, its public norms and values continually came into conflict with the private logic of its partner and, in all cases, private logic prevailed.
Domination of private logic could be a serious problem for an ICT4D partnership if it causes other logics to atrophy. A typical rationale for involvement of private-sector partners is engagement of commercial drive, resourcing and mindset to help deliver socioeconomic welfare benefits via use of ICT (Fife & Hosman, 2007; Kaliannan et al., 2010; Mizrachi & Ben-Attar, 2011) . This is particularly true of IT impact sourcing partnerships where the whole purpose is welfare improvements for marginalized groups. Yet in the process of negotiation, the welfare objectives for this initiative gradually disappeared. Any welfare outcomes of the project emerge as a fortunate by-product rather than beingas IT impact sourcing intendsthe defining core of the initiative. One reason is that the poor have no overt champion. Siva and InTech operate according to a private logic that finds no place for welfare outcomes and MGA is co-opted to that logic, perhaps fearing the project will have to be abandoned if Siva withdraws, and preferring any project to none at all. Siti and UniRa operate according to a public logic that could champion welfare outcomes for the poor, but their public logic has a university-specific flavor including internal political goals and it is, in any case, subjugated to private logic whenever overt conflict arises.
We may then compare this emergent outcome with past evidence. There have been ICT4D partnerships involving the private sector in which private logic does not appear to have dominated, reporting more of an accommodation or hybridization of logics (e.g. Kuriyan & Ray, 2009; Mirza, 2013) . But this is not the principal narrative. Instead, the findings of our Malaysian case epitomize threads that can be drawn out from past ICT4D partnership literature. Private logic (albeit not referred to as such) dominates, with:
. concerns about "relentless pursuit of profits" (Jamali, 2004, p. 118) and that "corporations are calling many of the shots" (McLaughlin, 2005, p. 58) ; . concerns about private-sector domination in both PPPs (e.g. Murray & Duran, 2002) and
in MSPs (Unwin, 2015) ; and . concerns about private-sector domination in ICT4D partnerships in many developing countries, including Malaysia itself (Kaliannan et al., 2010) .
This echoes findings from wider literature which report business interests coming to take precedence over social objectives where the two are mixed (e.g. Karnani, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013) . A particular criticism has been the difficulty in delivering welfare objectives to the poor, with initiatives involving the private sectorwhatever their initial intentionstargeting those with higher incomes (Kuriyan & Ray, 2009; Mirza, 2013; Murray & Duran, 2002) . It was not a purpose of our research to analyze causes for the logics outcomes seen, but we can note three aspects in the case of Merah, which may help explain private logic domination and thus suggest avenues for further investigation of explanators. First, resource dependency and imbalance. InTech held a unique set of expertise and contacts that was not readily substitutable. But UniRa was not that dissimilar to dozens of other public universities and so could fairly readily have been substituted as a partner. This mirrors the example of some ICT4D PPPs, where the private sector did not dominate (Kuriyan & Ray, 2009; Mirza, 2013) . In these examples, the public sector held core financial resources (and other sources of power such as being sole source of legitimate authority) and private-sector involvement was delivery of services for the public sector selected via competitive tender. Hence there was potential for substitution of private partners with competing bidders.
Second, and perhaps related, MGAthough it is a public agencydid not actively promote public logic. At the least, it remained silent and allowed InTech's private logic to dominate; and at the most, it actively reinforced the arguments emanating from private logic. The notion of the state supporting the interests of the private sectoreven of capture of the state by the private sectoris rarely discussed in ICT4D partnership literature (McLaughlin, 2005 is a brief exception) but it does echo arguments sometimes made in the wider development literature (e.g. Lucas, 1997; Marques & Utting, 2010) . Third, the personalities involved played a part, with Siva being a notably assertive character. In general, ICT4D research has so far had little to say about the role of key individuals but their importance and influence on initiativesincluding partnershipshas been acknowledged (Renken & Heeks, 2013) .
Conclusions
Partnerships are a central element of ICT4D, probably increasingly so. That they sometimes succeed but often do not suggests an important role for research to help understand and improve the management of these partnerships. That has been the task of this paper, focusing particularly on the conflicts that can undermine ICT4D partnerships. The case analysis showed these to be of two types. There was an underlying conflict of goals, cultures, and practices, which we conceptualized via the lens of institutional logics. And there was a manifestation of those underlying conflicts: a behavioral conflict which we conceptualized via the lens of the Thomas-Kilmann conflict management strategies framework. While any conceptualization necessarily simplifies what is in practice a more messy and complex reality, we believe these insights have both practical and theoretical value.
In terms of practical implications from the research reported here, the danger of domination by private logic and the danger that welfare objectives are sidelined in ICT4D partnerships must be put onto the risk agenda for such initiatives. Making this danger an explicit point of discussion will be a starting point, and risk mitigation will include trying to identify a spokesperson for the marginalized in negotiation processes. That spokesperson may not lie within the public sector: despite there being a welfare thread within public logic, experience from this case study showed that thread to be dominated by internal political goals within both the public agency and public university. Hence, there is support for the argument that poverty-related ICT4D partnerships should be multi-stakeholder partnerships that include a specific representative for a welfare/development logic that prioritizes the needs of the poor (Unwin, 2009) .
It could also be valuable in preliminary discussions to explicitly acknowledge the different logics of the partners, and to acknowledge that these may lead to conflicts that will need to be negotiated. Logics are "sticky" within organizations since they are essentially cumulative effects of institutional influences over the years, but that does not mean they cannot be successfully negotiated through more cooperative conflict management strategies. Additionally, this paper has demonstrated the multiplicity of strategies that can be and are adopted, contrasting to the more uni-strategic view identified in earlier work such as "collaboration" (e.g. Beck et al., 2015; Kuriyan & Ray, 2009 ).
In terms of theoretical contribution, this paper has:
. shown how institutional logics can be used as a conceptual frame to explain the causes and outcomes of conflict within ICT4D partnerships. It has provided a terminology and content of two particular logicspublic and privatewhich can readily be extended to analyze other ICT4D PPPs. It suggests that this framing could be extended to analyze other types of ICT4D partnership. It also builds momentum for the as-yet-small body of work applying institutional logics to ICT4D cases more broadly; and . combined institutional logics for the first time with a conflict management strategies framework that can be used to explain the enactment and outcomes of conflicting institutional logics where multiple actors are directly involved. As noted earlier, one gap in use of logics has been categorization of ensuing behaviors especially in situations of conflicting logics. The Thomas-Kilmann framework offers a new perspective on this. The combination of this framework with institutional logics has potential for much wider application to different types of ICT4D partnershipsnot just PPPs but other types of binary partnership and also MSPs.
We also see a conceptual contribution from the paper in highlighting two important aspects of ICT4D partnerships that have received rather limited attention to date. First, the negotiation of the terms of such initiatives, which can be critical in determining their nature and outcomes. Second, the actions of individual actors, which are critical but often sidelined in favor of more meso-level accounts using organizations and communities as the unit of analysis, or micro-level accounts that do not identify individuals. There are limitations to the above discussion. Analyzing the case via public and private logics is one choice. There are other logics at play that could be analyzed, for example, professional and market logics, and other types of logic would likely be needed to analyze other types of partnership such as MSPs. The analyzed pattern also focused on private logic and a particular form of public logic. As noted earlier, the threads of welfarism, bureaucracy, and pursuit of internal political goals within this public logic are identified in other public sector cases (e.g. Thompson, 2011) . However, there are somewhat different definitions of public logic that can be found in the literature which do not contain all of these elements (e.g. Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012) . In other words, while private logic is used in quite consistent ways, there is some variation in the understanding of what constitutes public logic.
Second, this paper is based on a single case. Single case research design is generally accepted with many precedents (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) but sometimes criticized for generalization potential. Following Walsham's (1995) guidance on generalization of interpretive cases, this paper focuses on theoretical development in the form of a combined framework and illustrated application of that framework, showing its ability to provide additional insights into ICT4D partnership. An agenda for future research is to build on this exploratory analysisfor example, to investigate why differing patterns of logic domination, accommodation, hybridization, etc. emerge in the practice of ICT4D partnerships.
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